The notion that every action has a consequence is a principle firmly embedded in many societies. One tenet of this principle is the belief that negative actions will have negative repercussions for the actor. Many of the laws governing the United States are primarily set up to ensure ramifications for criminal or other harmful actions in the hopes of deterring unwanted behavior. The ability to properly deter rests on the government’s capacity to enforce the laws in place. But what would happen if one were given the power to evade these repercussions? In Plato’s The Republic, Glaucon argues that, if given the opportunity, people would act unjustly, which proves justice to be only instrumentally good. Glaucon is wrong both in his assumptions and in his assessments.
Glaucon’s Argument
In the second book of The Republic, Glaucon plays devil’s advocate, taking up the position that, in certain instances, injustice is more beneficial than justice. To do this, he states that in the world there are three ways things may be good. First: “a kind of good we welcome, not because we desire what comes from it, but because we welcome it for its own sake” (Plato 357b). Glaucon gives the example of joy, as something that falls under this first type of good. Next: “a kind of good we like for its own sake and also for the sake of what comes from it” (357b-c). Glaucon give the example of both sight and good health. The last type of good is, in Glaucon’s eyes, the least desirable; he calls it an “onerous” good. This third good is beneficial, but “we wouldn’t choose them for their own sakes, but for the sake of the rewards and other things that come from them.” (357 c-d). This is where Glaucon places justice. He claims that people act justly in order to obtain the popularity and rewards that come from doing so. Glaucon soon adds avoidance of punishment, as an additional incentive to act justly.
Next, Glaucon asserts that people believe committing injustice is naturally good. “They say that to do injustice is naturally good and to suffer injustice bad” (358 e). However, Glaucon continues saying that suffering from injustice is so bad it exceeds the good that comes from committing it. “As a result, they begin to make laws and covenants, and what the commands they call lawful and just.” (359 a). Thus, Glaucon claims justice was created for the purposes of avoiding injustice, an account resembling heavily the ideals of social contract theory. This sets up justice as a thing which is only instrumentally good, for it is not done for itself, but rather to avoid the pain of injustice.
Finally, Glaucon introduces the Ring of Gyges. The ring is magical, allowing the one who wears it to become invisible. Glaucon states if anyone could get a hold of such ring, “no one, it seems, would be so incorruptible that he would stay on the path of justice” (360 b). Glaucon argues that all people would commit such crimes as theft, rape, and murder. This Glaucon contends, “is a great proof that one is never just willingly but only when compelled to be.” (360 c). Glaucon even goes so far as to claim that “every man believes that injustice is far more profitable to himself than justice.” (360 c). Then it seems Glaucon’s argument is based on the belief that, when given the chance, all people will choose injustice over justice. Additionally, that because people will take this path, it proves that justice is not intrinsically good, but rather only practiced because of its consequences.
False Assumptions
Glaucon’s argument is based on two assumptions. The first is the premise that all people, as a result of human nature, would act unjustly if free from punishment. The second is his belief that this proves justice has no intrinsic good. These assumptions are explicitly stated by Glaucon within the text of The Republic (as shown in the quotes above). Refuting these assumptions will not by itself prove that Glaucon’s conclusion is inaccurate (a task taken up later on). However, showing that the premises are false will at least discredit part of Glaucon’s argument; further steps will be taken later on to refute his conclusion.
Glaucon is wrong in claiming that all people will act unjustly, if given the ring. Laws do not play a major role in all choices to refrain from injustice. To be sure, the presence of laws punishing murder do not stop those who would never commit murder from committing murder, but rather it is because of their own design that they refrain. In other words, many people will act justly regardless of legal statutes ordering them to do so. The Underground Railroad, in American history, serves as an example of how those who could have profited from injustice turned against it for the sake of justice. Many white abolitionists helped slaves escape slavery, for no other reason than their belief that slavery was unjust. Certainly, they could have profited from slavery. In addition, there was nothing for them to gain by ending slavery, in that by terminating slavery white abolitionists were not protecting themselves from becoming slaves (protection from injustice is what Glaucon states was the origin of laws and justice). In fact, by going against laws prohibiting what they felt was the just thing to do, white abolitionists put themselves and their families at risk. Thus, their actions can only be described as a selfless endeavor to promote justice.
In addition, Glaucon fails to see the good that can be done with the ring. It seems that Glaucon’s belief that people would act unjustly is founded on the ability to achieve fortune through such actions. For every crime that Glaucon insists will occur, other than rape, seems to be rooted in the obtainment of property (assuming that murder is done not solely for fun). However, it is not unreasonable to conclude that living a just life would bring about the same fortune, if one had the ring. There are endless ways in which one can profit from the ring, while still living justly. A reasonable counter to this is the belief that injustice may be easier than justice. However, that is false. It could be said that it is actually be harder for people to carry out actions like rape and murder. After a tour of duty, many military soldiers often having trouble coping with the horrors they experienced during war. This serves as a fundamental counter Glaucon’s belief that it is easier to commit unjust acts, for soldiers are not normally held accountable to their sovereign for deaths they caused in service. Therefore, any distress is the result of a difficulty of committing such actions. The point is not that killing in battle is unjust, but rather that killing is difficult to bring oneself to do. Even for some “recreational killers”, if you will, killing is not always done without pain.
Thus, it seems that for all relevant purposes, justice and injustice would, provide the same materialistic benefits and carry the same burden (however, for different people). Therefore, if for no other reason, the reputation that comes with justice provides enough incentive for many people to follow a just life. Certainly the fact that crime occurs in the first place, makes it obvious that many will use the ring unjustly. However, this does not mean that everyone or even most people, who would not otherwise commit unjust acts, would act unjustly given the ring. It is harder to make a case for how justice can counter ‘benefit’ of rape, without going off on a tangent over the possible enhanced attractiveness, which may come with the ability to turn invisible. However, a point can be made that any person who would appeal to rape, given the ring, would be among those who would not choose to live justly, in the first place.
Glaucon’s next assumption is more complex. In stating that because everyone would act unjustly, if given the ring, justice is not intrinsically good, Glaucon assumes that people know what is good for them. While people know to a certain extent what is in their best interest, it is false to assume that they always do, or even that they always act as such. This is the main flaw in Glaucon’s logic. The prominent, and even universal, application of an action is not sufficient in proving that such an action is beneficial. For example, many people eat food that is highly caloric. While that food may taste good at the time of consumption, the damage it does to one’s body certainly outweighs any momentary pleasure. Yet, many people still eat fatty foods, most with the knowledge that such foods are detrimental to their health. This is not an attempt to argue that, if given a device that could prevent fatty foods from harming one’s body one would not be justified in eating fatty foods (much like a ring of Gyges example). Rather, that the widespread practice of an action does not prove that action to be beneficial, since many actions commonly practice are in fact non-beneficial.
The Intrinsic Good of Justice
Glaucon gives the example of joy for something is intrinsically good, because it is a pleasure in and of itself. He gives the example of good health, as something which is both intrinsically good and good because of what comes from it. It is not difficult to see why Glaucon uses good health as an example of the second type of good. One feels fresh when he is healthy (intrinsically good). Also, good health allows you to perform many tasks better than you would if unhealthy (good for the sake of what comes from it). However, it is difficult to make the same case for justice, but only because of the limited scope that Glaucon allows things to be intrinsically good. For instance, to say that a just act makes one happy (not because of reputation or absence of punishment but because of knowing one did the right thing), might be thought of as good because of what it brings about. The problem is that because justice is not a feeling or a state of being, but rather a concept which describes actions (as far as its application to a person being or acting just), it is hard to say that it is good within itself, since any good that comes from justice must first be proceeded by a just act, bringing the impression that such good is consequence of justice rather than an intrinsic good. Thus, the only way one can see justice as the second type of good, is to prove that justice brings about a positive feeling that occurs regardless of society’s impact. In short, one must prove that, in the absence of external factors (such as laws, reputation, and rewards), justice is still worth abiding by because of the benefit it brings to oneself internally.
For many, just actions bring about a positive feeling. It is not uncommon to hear people expressing feelings of happiness after they helped another or acted in a just manner. Even when acting justly is seen as more burdensome, it is not justice that people find distasteful, but rather the act in question. For example, assuming that taxes are just and that paying taxes is just, it is not justice that people dislike but rather specifically paying taxes. In fact, in the absence of laws enforcing payment of taxes, few people would pay their fair share of taxes, and acting justly would be the only reason for the small number of people to pay their fair share of taxes.
Not only is justice never the root cause of distaste, but actual just acts are never onerous but only at times seen as so as a consequence of ignorance. This is due to a lack of foresight. One can think of this in terms of trying a new type of food. First, assume that this food is tasteful, but looks repulsive. When one sees such a meal, one may think it will taste as it looks. However, if that same person tried the meal, it would become apparent that it was, in fact, delightful. The same can be said of justice. At first glance, acting justly may seem burdensome. However, if the action truly is just, once acted out, pleasure instead of pain will be revealed. This pleasure is from acting justly, for one doesn’t experience pleasure because of the just action (for if they did Glaucon would be wrong in assuming that people would prefer unjust actions), but rather directly related to justice itself.
In addition, Glaucon does not given any decent argument as to why injustice is intrinsically good. He certainly gives examples of what can occur from injustice without punishment, but never does he state how these injustices are intrinsically good. For example, one could very well argue that murdering a billionaire and stealing his wealth may lead to fortune, and maybe even happiness. However can he make the argument that the act of murdering is inherently good? The answer is no. Thus, even if justice has no intrinsic goodness, it loses no credibility, for it is only in a stalemate with injustice as far as goodness is concerned. To be fair, the burden of proof rests with Socrates and not Glaucon; as well Glaucon is playing devil’s advocate and does not necessarily believe these things himself. However, after Glaucon asserts himself as a devil’s advocate he states: “But I’ve yet to hear anyone defend justice in the way I want” (357c). Glaucon sounds as though he wants to be convinced; his irritation with Socrates for not fully convincing him of justice’s worth at the start of the chapter further this notion. However, Glaucon only needed to look to his own criteria (or at least the criteria he gives) and apply that to injustice, for if both fail to meet his standard (which as stated injustice will) his fault with justice should be resolved, since equal fault will appear in the alternative (making such misgivings irrelevant). Also, Glaucon is wrong in his belief in the inferiority of his third type of goodness (something that is good not within itself but from what results in it). There are multiple instances in which things falling into Glaucon’s third type of good are in way inferior to others that are of his second type. For example, being intelligent may very well be a good within itself (allows one to feel secure in one's abilities) and the things that it may bring. However, intelligence is nothing without hard work. In fact, academic inquiry enhances one's own intellect. This finding appears again in Glaucon's own example of the second type of good, being healthy. To be healthy, it is practically essential for most humans, to exercise and seek medical care; things Glaucon says are types that are only instrumentally good. Thus, just because such things are in fact onerous, many are necessary for the achievement of, at least, some of the second types of good, and thus are in no way inferior to the two other types of good. In fact they may be thought of as the best, for without some them many of the second types of good would unattainable.
To act just is neither irrational nor is it more burdensome than simply acting unjustly. In fact, it will result in the best outcomes when done. Furthermore, justice is in fact inherently good, because of the intrinsic pleasure that comes from knowing one acted justly. Thus, it is evident that Glaucon was wrong in his argument of and assessment on the goodness of justice.
